WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN: READING THE INKBLOTS
This is an article from Maj Josh Wineera almost a year ago. it looks at a concept for the extraction of forces from contested stabilization operations such as Afghanistan.
With the ongoing handover from ISAF to local forces and its pending withdrawal, in particular of the USA, the article makes for interesting reading and hypothesises on some not-so-new operational concepts.
Barry Dreyer on October 9, 2013 at 9:32 AM said:
TWO US GENERALS FIRED FOR SECURITY LAPSES
From the Washington Post – “The incident brings into stark relief the unique challenges of waging war in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops over the past two years has forced commanders to triage, sometimes leading them to thin out defenses.”
Josh Wineara wrote ” Drawing back to a concentration area, or a central hub, for departure might seem like a logical method to reduce the ISAF footprint in the provinces. For this to be achieved an assumption would need to be made in terms of the previously held (by ISAF) security zone remaining intact. That is an assumption that will hold up in some provinces, for others it will remain questionable – certainly a major risk consideration. Possibly some ISAF contingents might contemplate holding the outer security areas in place and hollowing out the main force from the rear first. The last element to withdraw would be the outer security forces having provided a ‘shield’. Military proponents would recognise these two options as merely tactical methods of withdrawing from a main defensive position, and so they are. Could they however, become the basis to start conceptualising and visualising what ISAFs oil spots could look like in reve